# The Framing Effect: How Wording Alone Flips Preference From 72% to 22%

Cite as: Gorak, R. (2026). The Framing Effect: How Wording Alone Flips Preference From 72% to 22%. Tradicted. https://www.tradicted.com/research/tversky-framing-1981/
Paper: Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman — *The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice*
Published in: Science (1981)
Original: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1685855

Key finding: Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found that framing an identical outcome as lives saved led 72 percent of respondents to choose the certain option, while framing it as lives lost led only 22 percent to choose the same certain option.

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The framing effect describes how logically identical decisions produce different choices depending on whether outcomes are described as gains or as losses. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) test this in *The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice*. They presented logically identical problems, worded differently, to separate respondent groups. In their disease-control problem, 72 percent chose the certain option framed as lives saved (N=152). Only 22 percent chose the same option framed instead as lives lost (N=155).

## What the Study Found

In Problem 3, 84 percent preferred a sure $240 gain over a 25% chance to gain $1000. For the mirrored loss version, 87 percent preferred a 75% chance to lose $1000 over a sure $750 loss. In a two-stage version of a $30-versus-$45 gamble, 74 percent chose the sure $30 (Problem 6). When the same probabilities were presented as a single-stage gamble, only 42 percent chose the equivalent $30 option (Problem 7). 88 percent still bought a play ticket after losing an unrelated $10 bill (Problem 8). Only 46 percent bought a replacement after losing the ticket itself (Problem 9).

## Methodology

The data came from brief questionnaires administered in a classroom setting to students at Stanford University and the University of British Columbia. Each of the ten problems was presented to a separate group of respondents, ranging from 77 to 200 people per problem. A separate group of respondents completed a modified version of Problem 3 with real monetary payoffs, replicating the pattern found with hypothetical outcomes. Different respondents received different versions of each problem, so comparisons are between groups rather than within the same individuals.

## Key Statistics

| Metric | Finding | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Certain option chosen, gain frame | 72% | Problem 1, N=152, "lives saved" wording |
| Certain option chosen, loss frame | 22% | Problem 2, N=155, "lives lost" wording |
| Sure $240 gain chosen over risky $1000 gain | 84% | Problem 3, Decision (i), N=150 |
| Risky $1000 loss chosen over sure $750 loss | 87% | Problem 3, Decision (ii), N=150 |
| Sure $30 win chosen (certainty-framed) | 74% | Problem 6, N=85 |
| $30 option chosen (identical odds, no certainty stage) | 42% | Problem 7, N=81 |
| Still bought ticket after losing unrelated $10 | 88% | Problem 8, N=183 |
| Bought replacement after losing the ticket itself | 46% | Problem 9, N=200 |
| Drove to save $5 on $15 calculator | 68% | Problem 10, low-price version, N=93 |
| Drove to save $5 on $125 calculator | 29% | Problem 10, high-price version, N=88 |
| Prospect theory value function | π(p) v(x) + π(q) v(y) | Overall value of a two-outcome prospect |
| Weighting function ratio property | π(pq)/π(p) is less than π(pqr)/π(pr) | Property of the decision-weight function π |

## Why This Matters

Standard expected-utility theory assumes preferences stay stable across logically equivalent descriptions of the same choice. Wording alone reversed the preferred option in this study, independent of the underlying probabilities and payoffs. Prospect theory's value function and decision-weight function offer a framework for anticipating when risk attitudes shift with presentation rather than substance. Framing investment choices, insurance products, or trading rules as gains versus losses can shift client decisions without changing the underlying numbers. Framing effects operate on decisions you have already made, which is why the record matters more than the memory. A [trading journal](/trading-journal/) captures the reasoning at the time of the decision.

## FAQ

### What is the framing effect in Tversky and Kahneman's 1981 study?

72 percent of respondents chose the certain option when an outcome was framed as lives saved (Problem 1). Only 22 percent chose the identical option when it was framed instead as lives lost (Problem 2). Tversky and Kahneman (1981) call this the framing effect. Preferences reverse based on wording rather than the underlying probabilities or outcomes.

### What does prospect theory say about how people weight probabilities?

π(0) = 0 and π(1) = 1 are the boundary conditions of prospect theory's decision-weight function, according to Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Low probabilities are overweighted and moderate-to-high probabilities are underweighted. The function also satisfies π(pq)/π(p) less than π(pqr)/π(pr) for all probabilities p, q, r between 0 and 1.

### What is the certainty effect in decision-making under risk?

74 percent chose a sure $30 win after a preliminary stage that could end the game (Problem 6). Only 42 percent chose the equivalent $30 option when the same probabilities were presented without that preliminary stage (Problem 7). Tversky and Kahneman call this the certainty effect, where a probability reduction matters more when the reference point was certainty.

### How does the framing of a price change affect willingness to shop around?

68 percent said they would drive 20 minutes to save $5 on a $15 calculator, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found. Only 29 percent would make the same trip to save $5 on a $125 calculator. By the curvature of the value function, a $5 discount has greater impact at a low reference price.

## Source

Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. *Science*, 211(4481), 453–458.

[Read the full paper →](https://www.jstor.org/stable/1685855)